The Bab el-Mandeb strait — "Gate of Tears" in Arabic — is the narrow passage at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, separating the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) from the Horn of Africa (Djibouti and Eritrea). It is one of the world's most strategically significant maritime chokepoints, carrying approximately 6-7 million barrels per day of oil and refined products in normal conditions plus substantial broader commercial traffic. All vessels transiting the Suez Canal must also transit Bab el-Mandeb, making the two chokepoints a coupled system from a shipping perspective.
The strait has become globally prominent since late 2023 as the site of sustained Houthi attacks on commercial shipping that have produced the most consequential single ongoing disruption to maritime commerce in modern history. The Houthi campaign has rerouted substantial portions of global container, oil, and other commercial traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, raised freight rates substantially, and forced multinational naval responses with limited overall effect on the underlying threat. Understanding contemporary global oil shipping requires understanding the Bab el-Mandeb situation in detail.
Geography of the Strait
Bab el-Mandeb is approximately 30 kilometers wide at its narrowest, with the Perim Island (Yemen-controlled) dividing the strait into two principal channels:
- The eastern channel (between Perim and Yemen mainland) — Narrower at approximately 3 kilometers wide, with shallower depths that constrain large vessel transit
- The western channel (between Perim and Djibouti) — Wider at approximately 25 kilometers, with deeper navigation channels that handle the majority of large vessel traffic
Both channels have been used for traffic separation under the International Maritime Organization framework, with the deeper western channel being the principal route for large oil tankers.
The strait's geography makes it a natural chokepoint that cannot be physically expanded or bypassed for the underlying Red Sea-Indian Ocean traffic. Any vessel transiting between the Red Sea and the broader Indian Ocean must pass through Bab el-Mandeb.
Strategic Significance
Bab el-Mandeb's importance derives from its position as the only Red Sea entry from the Indian Ocean. The Red Sea is one of the world's most heavily-used maritime corridors because of the Suez Canal at its northern end — and Suez Canal access requires Bab el-Mandeb transit. The chokepoint therefore controls the Asia-Europe and Asia-Mediterranean shipping that uses the Suez routing.
Approximately 12-15% of global trade by value passes through Bab el-Mandeb in normal conditions, including the great majority of the container traffic between Asia and Europe and substantial oil and refined product flows. The chokepoint's broader importance extends beyond oil to electronics, manufactured goods, foodstuffs, and essentially the full range of Asia-Europe commercial trade.
Oil Volumes Through Bab el-Mandeb
Crude oil and refined products through Bab el-Mandeb total approximately 6-7 million barrels per day in normal conditions, including:
- Northbound crude — Persian Gulf crude flowing to European markets via Suez routing
- Northbound products — Indian, Middle Eastern, and Asian refined product flows to European markets
- Southbound flows — European refined products to African and Asian markets, plus the growing post-2022 flow of Russian crude redirected to Asia via Mediterranean-Suez routing
The northbound crude flows have been substantially affected by the Houthi disruption, with much rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. The southbound flows have been less disrupted because Russian-origin vessels have been less directly targeted by Houthi attacks than vessels with claimed ties to the U.S., U.K., or Israel.
The Houthi Attack Campaign
Beginning in late 2023, the Houthi movement (formally Ansar Allah) — the de facto governing authority over substantial portions of Yemen including the Red Sea coastline — launched a sustained campaign of attacks on commercial shipping transiting Bab el-Mandeb and the southern Red Sea. The campaign was framed by the Houthis as solidarity action with Palestinians during the Israel-Hamas war that began in October 2023.
The attacks have used several methods:
- Anti-ship cruise missiles — Including various Iranian-origin and Houthi-modified weapons
- Anti-ship ballistic missiles — Including the world's first operational use of anti-ship ballistic missiles against commercial vessels
- Drone boats (uncrewed surface vessels) — Including improvised explosive variants
- Aerial drones — One-way attack drones and reconnaissance platforms
- Boarding operations — Including the high-profile November 2023 boarding and seizure of the Galaxy Leader vehicle carrier
- Limpet mine attacks — Reported in some incidents
The Houthis have stated targeting criteria focused on vessels with claimed Israeli, U.S., or U.K. ownership, operation, or destination linkages. The actual targeting has been broader and sometimes appeared less discriminating than the stated criteria, with vessels of various flags and ownership profiles affected by attacks.
Cumulative attack incidents have totaled hundreds of attacks since late 2023, with damages ranging from minor near-misses to catastrophic vessel losses including the March 2024 sinking of the Rubymar (a bulk carrier carrying fertilizer) and several other vessel losses.
The Multinational Naval Response
Several coordinated naval responses have been deployed to address the Houthi threat:
Operation Prosperity Guardian. A U.S.-led multinational maritime security operation launched in December 2023, with participation from the U.K., Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles, Spain (subsequently withdrawn), and others. The operation provides naval escort and missile/drone defense for commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea.
EU Operation Aspides. A European Union naval mission launched in February 2024 focused specifically on commercial vessel defense, with participation from multiple EU members.
U.S./U.K. strikes on Houthi positions. Repeated military strikes on Houthi missile launchers, drone facilities, command and control sites, and other targets in Yemen. The strikes have moderated the attack pace at various points but have not fundamentally degraded Houthi capability.
Individual national naval deployments. India, China, Russia, Iran, and others have maintained naval presence in the broader region, with varying degrees of cooperation with the multinational efforts.
The naval response has prevented many attempted attacks and limited damage in others. However, the multinational effort has not been able to fully restore confidence in Red Sea transit, with substantial commercial traffic continuing to reroute via the Cape of Good Hope despite the available escort.
The Rerouting Economics
The commercial response to the Houthi threat has been substantial rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. The economic impact includes:
- Voyage time addition — Typically 10-14 days for Asia-Europe voyages
- Freight rate increases — Container freight rates rose by 200%+ during peak disruption periods; tanker rates rose less dramatically but substantially
- Bunker fuel consumption — Substantial additional fuel costs from the longer voyages
- Carbon emissions — Approximately 30% additional emissions per voyage for Asia-Europe traffic
- Inventory and working capital implications — Longer voyages tie up additional inventory and require additional working capital
- Schedule reliability impact — Cape routing introduces additional weather and operational risk factors
For the oil market specifically, the rerouting has affected differentials between regions, with European oil supply receiving incremental cost burden from rerouted Persian Gulf imports and from rerouted Indian product imports. The Suez Canal premium for European-destined cargoes has at times been a meaningful component of European refining cost structures.
For deeper coverage of the Suez Canal context, see our Suez Canal/SUMED page.
Differential Impact by Vessel Type
The Houthi targeting and the resulting rerouting have affected different vessel types differently:
Container shipping. Most heavily affected, with all major container lines rerouting substantially. The container shipping sector's higher concern for cargo and crew safety, combined with U.S. and Israeli linkages in container ownership and operation, drove the most complete rerouting.
Oil tankers. Variably affected. Some operators continued Suez transit; others rerouted. The split reflected different risk tolerance, different vessel/flag/ownership profiles, and different cargo origin/destination patterns.
Russian-origin tankers. Substantially continued Suez transit, reflecting both the Houthi targeting prioritization that exempted Russian-related shipping and the broader Russia-Houthi alignment that emerged through the campaign.
Iranian-related tankers. Continued Suez transit with even greater security than Russian-related shipping.
Bulk carriers and other commercial shipping. Variable rerouting based on cargo and ownership profiles.
The Yemen Political Context
The Houthi movement's effective control over the principal Yemeni Red Sea coastline since the 2014-2015 Yemen civil war has been the structural enabler of the attack campaign. The internationally-recognized Yemeni government and various other Yemeni factions control other portions of the country but not the principal areas from which Bab el-Mandeb attacks have been launched.
Resolution of the underlying Houthi threat would require either substantial military defeat of the movement (which has been pursued by the Saudi-led coalition since 2015 without success) or political resolution of the broader Yemen conflict that addresses Houthi grievances and integrates the movement into a stable political settlement. Neither path has shown substantial progress.
The Israel-Hamas war's eventual resolution would presumably affect Houthi attack motivation, but the Houthi capability and political position have become sufficiently established that residual maritime threat may persist regardless of broader Middle East dynamics.
What Drives Bab el-Mandeb Disruption
Houthi attack intensity. The dominant short-term variable since late 2023.
Israel-Hamas conflict dynamics. Broader conflict resolution would presumably affect Houthi motivation.
Iranian regional positioning. Iran's relationship with Houthi capability is the principal external influence.
Naval response effectiveness. Multinational protection capabilities affect rerouting decisions.
Insurance market pricing. War risk premiums affect routing economics.
Yemen internal political dynamics. Underlying conflict resolution affects long-term threat trajectory.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait in One Sentence
Bab el-Mandeb is the 30-kilometer-wide chokepoint at the southern Red Sea entrance — handling approximately 12-15% of global trade by value and 6-7 million barrels per day of oil flows in normal conditions — that has become the focus of the most disruptive non-state attack on commercial shipping in modern history through the sustained Houthi campaign since late 2023.
Continue Reading
- The Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline — the coupled Mediterranean transit system
- The Strait of Hormuz — the world's most important oil chokepoint
- Saudi Arabia oil
- Iran oil
- Oil market glossary